Alliant Energy Corp

The chief executive holds $12.7M of the $24.1M total — 52.6% of unvested value across the named executive group.

Figures are unvested holdings at fiscal year end as disclosed in the Outstanding Equity Awards table. Vesting dates are not part of that table's disclosure, so no vesting schedule or time-based ladder is presented. Market values are as disclosed by the company.

SoP support remains robust at 95.73% but the FY2024-to-FY2025 decline of 69 bps ended a multi-year improving trend; the committee's assessment that no modifications were required may warrant revisiting if the downward trailing run continues ahead of the May 2027 annual meeting.

The ratio held flat 0.0% from FY2024 (51:1) to FY2025 (51:1).

Market capitalisation $19.4B as of 2026-08-02. Market capitalisation is a point-in-time figure and is not stated on the same fiscal-year basis as the pay ratio.

Alliant Energy Corp most recently recorded 95.73% support — the 95–100% band, at the 45th percentile of its disclosed peer group.

Each peer contributes its most recently disclosed say-on-pay result. Peers with no captured result are excluded from the distribution and counted above, never imputed.

Peers naming Alliant Energy Corp: AEE, ATO, BKH, CMS, CNP, ES, EVRG, HE, IDA, MDU, NI, OGE, PNW, POR, PPL, SWX, TXNM, WEC.

One-way selections — named by Alliant Energy Corp but not naming it back: AVA, PEG.

Reciprocity is the share of a company's own disclosed peers that select it in return. A high share indicates a peer group the market agrees with; a low share indicates a group selected on criteria the peers themselves do not apply, which proxy advisors scrutinise. One-way selection is not by itself a defect — size, business-mix and talent-market reasons can each justify it — but it is the question a compensation committee should expect to be asked.

1. The multi-year pay-mix trajectory shows STI weight expanded 5.5 percentage points and LTI weight expanded 7.3 percentage points from FY2023 to FY2025, while 'other' compensation compressed 13.8 percentage points. This evolution concentrates pay in performance-linked vehicles, consistent with the CD&A's emphasis on aligning 'executives' interests with those of our shareowners.' The committee could consider documenting this trajectory as intentional design convergence toward peer LTI norms in the FY2026 CD&A.
2. The annual disclosure-advisor screen overall reads LOW, with PMR, RDA, and PTA all at low concern — CEO pay of $9.0M sits at 0.90x peer median of $9.99M, below the 1.89x non-S&P 500 threshold.
3. The STI program loads 70% weight onto a single EPS metric, against peer practice of more balanced scorecards — ES spreads 60% across eleven metrics; BKH allocates 70% to EPS but layers ten operational measures beneath it. The concentration leaves the program exposed to proxy-advisor scrutiny if EPS outcomes disconnect from operational performance, and the committee may want to examine whether the six customer/safety metrics at 3-6% each provide meaningful differentiation or merely dilute accountability.
4. Pay-Disclosure Alignment (Minor Gap) — The annual disclosure states: 'Our compensation vision is to provide compensation programs that promote the achievement of our growth strategy, provide competitive compensation opportunities to attract, retain and motivate a highly talented executive team, and align executives' interests with those of our shareowners.' CEO total compensation of $9.0M sits at the 40th percentile against a stated 50th-percentile target, producing a 10-point gap that warrants committee review of target calibration ahead of the May 2027 annual meeting.

• Proxy-advisor qualitative scrutiny on STI metric concentration is the likely trigger if EPS beats narrow targets while operational indicators lag. The committee must restructure to a primary-secondary metric framework with no single metric above 50% before the FY2026 grant cycle.
• The annual disclosure-advisor screen on PSU design will likely flag the missing absolute TSR underpin as peer practice evolves. The committee must add a 0% absolute TSR threshold or modifier before the FY2026 grant cycle to maintain design parity.
• The philosophy-outcome gap invites proxy-advisor scrutiny on target calibration credibility — The committee must reframe the FY2026 CD&A to explain whether the 40th percentile reflects deliberate cost discipline, transition-year positioning, or target-setting error, and anchor the narrative to the pay-return gap classification.
• PSU absolute TSR guardrail addition — 9 of 17 peers with disclosed PSU designs embed absolute-return thresholds or modifiers; LNT's 35% TSR with no floor creates asymmetric payout risk. The annual disclosure-advisor screen on design evolution will capture this gap in 2026. — Add a 0% absolute TSR threshold or relative TSR modifier to the PSU design before the FY2026 grant cycle, with disclosure of the peer-prevalence basis in the FY2026 CD&A.
• Target positioning disclosure refresh — The 10-point gap between 50th-percentile philosophy and 40th-percentile outcome, combined with 29.1% YoY growth against 15.6% peer CAGR, requires narrative clarity. The pay-return gap classification provides defensive cover if framed explicitly. — Recalibrate the FY2026 CD&A philosophy section to explain the 40th-percentile outcome as cost discipline or transition positioning, cite the peer-median 0.90x PMR, and anchor the narrative to the pay-return gap.

• What it is: Realizable pay is a Velarion-computed measure, not a figure the company discloses. It estimates what an executive's FY2025 compensation is worth today: cash compensation paid for the fiscal year (base salary plus the annual cash incentive actually paid) plus the current value of equity awards that remain unvested.
• Valuation anchor: Unvested equity is valued at $70.78 per share, the closing price as of August 2, 2026. Realizable figures move with the share price; the figures in this report are reproducible only against that price and date.
• Included: Unvested full-value awards (restricted stock and restricted stock units; performance shares and performance stock units) and unvested stock options and stock appreciation rights.
• Excluded: Equity already vested or exercised, retirement and deferred-compensation balances, and perquisites and other benefits. Vested holdings are not part of realizable pay.
• Unvested, unearned and performance awards: Full-value awards are valued at unvested shares × the anchor price. Performance awards — including awards still unearned pending performance certification — are included at the unvested share count reported in the company's outstanding-awards table (target unless the company reports a different count): not probability-weighted, not at maximum payout. Options and SARs are valued at intrinsic value: max(0, anchor price − exercise price) × unvested shares.
• Share counts: Unvested share counts as reported in the company's outstanding equity awards table as of fiscal year end. The same share counts are used at every price anchor, so any two realizable figures for the same executive differ only by the price they were struck at.
• The ratio: Realizable-to-granted = realizable pay ÷ total compensation reported in the company's summary compensation table for the same fiscal year ("granted"). For the CEO: $16.8M ÷ $9.0M = 1.87×.